Innovation, Information and Financial Architecture by Tadesse, Solomon
 
  
 
THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation, Information and Financial Architecture 
 
 
 
By: Solomon Tadesse 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 877 
June 2007  
 
 
INNOVATION, INFORMATION and FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 
 
 
 
 
Solomon Tadesse
∗
University of Michigan 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Does a financial system architecture anchored on banks better than one centered on markets in fostering 
technological innovations as engine of growth? In a panel of industrial sectors across a large cross section 
of countries, I find that while market-based systems have a general positive effect on innovations in all 
economic sectors, bank-based systems foster more rapid technological progress in more information-
intensive industrial sectors, suggesting a heterogeneous impact of financial architecture. Thus, the relative 
performance of bank-based systems vis-à-vis market-based systems depends on the industrial structure of 
the economy.    
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The relative merits of financial intermediaries vis-a-vis financial markets as providers of capital 
has been a recurring theme in corporate finance. A macro-economic version of this issue is whether the 
financial architecture of an economy – i.e., the degree to which its financial system is bank-oriented or 
market-based – has any impact on economic performance in the real sector. Does financial architecture 
matter for long-term growth, and in particular, in fostering innovations and technology.  The debate, 
which goes as far back as Schumpeter (1912) and Bagehot (1873), commenced with reference to 
Germany and the United Kingdom in the late ninteen century, and later expanded to include the U.S. as a 
prototype market-based system and Japan as a representation of bank-based economy
1.  It has become 
more fervent in recent times because financial system configuration is at the core of market reform 
policies in transition and emerging economies that are in route to capitalism from decades of totaliterian 
repression. This paper explores empirically the relation between technological innovation and financial 
architecture, focusing on differences between markets and banks in processing information. 
The role of financial architecture in fostering innovation and technology is theoretically 
controversial. The bank-based and the market-based views primarily emphasize the merits of banks or 
financial markets in mitigating informational imperfections.  Markets and banks perform vital functions 
in an economy, including capital formation, risk sharing, information production and monitoring. The 
case for bank-based or market-oriented systems is usually made by focusing on the relative effectiveness 
with which banks or markets execute these common functions.  In particular, a key attribute of financial 
markets - a feature that distinguishes them from banks - is that prices formed in financial markets 
provide valuable information to real decisions of firms. This is what is called the ‘information feedback’ 
function of markets.  There are two important properties of this information feedback function – namely, 
that prices aggregate diverse informed opinions about the firm’s investment opportunities, and that 
information is revealed to third parties relatively easily.  With banks, instead of investors producing 
                                                 
1 Allen and Gale (1995), Boot and Thakor (1997), and Allen and Gale (2000) provide excellent reviews of the 
literature on the merits of bank-based versus market-based systems. 
  1information through trading and conveying it via prices, loan officers generate information while 
evaluating projects for loan financing. To contrast, while such information generation is different from 
the price mechanism, bank-generated information is also relatively safe from leakage. These 
fundamental differences in the manner in which information is processed by banks vis-a-vis financial 
markets have critical implications for the relative performance of bank-based versus market-based 
financial systems, particularly in fostering innovations and technology. 
The market-based view holds that markets have attributes in processing information that 
intermediaries do not have that are advantageous in fostering innovative technologies.  In the first place, 
financial markets facilitate the identification of profitable innovative investment opportunities through 
their information-feedback function (see, e.g., Boot and Thakor (1997)).  Moreover, market-based 
systems facilitate innovation by allowing financing when diversity of opinion prevails (see Allen (1993); 
Allen and Gale (1999)).  The argument is that assessment of new technologies is difficult either because 
little information is available about their potential returns or because the information itself is difficult to 
judge without some expertise, indicating that there is often substantial diversity of opinion. Bank-based 
financing requires delegation of the decision regarding financing to a relatively small number of decision 
makers. When there is no disagreement, this delegation is effective and entails cost savings. It is, 
however, problematic if diversity of opinion persists, because some of the providers of funds would 
disagree with the decisions of the delegated monitor. Bank-based finance, therefore would under-fund 
new technologies. Financial markets, on the other hand, permit individuals to agree to disagree, and 
therefore allow coalition of investors with similar views to join together to finance projects. Hence, 
markets are effective in financing new industries and technologies where relevant data is completely 
lacking
2.  
                                                 
2 Other arguments in favor of market-based systems are also offered.  For example, as creditors, banks are risk 
averse or conservative, and have bias against financing innovation (Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), and Morck and 
Nakamura (1999)).  Also, powerful banks reduce the firms’ incentive to undertake innovative, projects by extracting 
informational rents (Hellwig (1991), and Rajan (1992)). In addition, capital markets, by allowing the financing of 
long-term projects by savers with short-term liquidity needs, enable the adoption of innovative but long-gestation 
technologies (Hicks (1969); Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1995); and Saint-Paul (1992)). 
  2On the other hand, the bank-based view emphasizes the relative disadvantages of markets in 
processing information particularly relevant for firms’ incentive to innovate. First, financial markets 
could lead to underinvestment in information acquisition in the first place, with a negative impact on 
identification of innovative projects. The argument is that efficient markets reduce the incentives of 
investors to generate information about firms because others could free-ride on ones’ costly information 
(Grossman (1976); Stiglitz (1985)). In contrast, banks dissipate less information to the public, providing 
incentives to generate information (Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1993)). Second, and more 
importantly, financing innovations through markets may risk the revelation of proprietary technological 
information to the firms’ competitors, providing greater incentives to finance innovation via banks 
(Bhattachcharya and Chiesa (1995); Yosha (1995))
3. The idea is that firms with valuable innovations 
may value confidentiality.  Information disclosed in multilateral financing (i.e., markets) will eventually 
be available to third parties including the firms’ competitors. By contrast, bilateral (i.e., bank) financing 
results in less leakage.  In equilibrium, high quality firms with valuable innovations prefer bilateral  (i.e., 
bank) financing to multilateral (i.e., market) financing (Yosha (1995)). Conversely, the architecture of 
the financial system affects the incentives of firms to innovate. The importance of confidentiality to 
innovative firms means that firms with observationally more sensitive information – those with the most 
to lose from leakage of their private information – fare better in bank-based financial systems
4.    
                                                 
3 A related notion is that of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) who argue that bank-based financing is vulnerable to 
renegotiation problems, and that market-based finance might be superior because it maintains commitments not to 
renegotiate. This is so because of the free-rider problem and the high transaction costs involved in negotiating with a 
large number of bondholders. But others have shown that renegotiation is not necessarily bad; it is welfare-
enhancing (see, e.g., Allen and Gale (2000)). 
4 Other arguments for bank-based systems are also offered. First, bank-based systems are more effective in funding 
new and innovative activities that require staged financing (Stulz (2000)) because banks can credibly commit to 
making additional funding as the project develops. Second, banks more effectively finance industrial expansion in 
underdeveloped economies (Gerschenkron (1962), Boyd and Smith (1996, 1998), since powerful banks can induce 
firms to reveal information better than markets in such economies (Rajan and Zingales (1999a)). Third, bank-based 
systems encourage innovation by facilitating the financing of long-term projects through reducing liquidity risk 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990); and Bencivenga and Smith (1991)).  Some also argue that banks are better for 
corporate governance.  Efficient markets may hamper the effectiveness of takeovers as a corporate governance tool 
by providing incentives to atomistic investors to hold up (Grossman and Hart (1980)), and that liquid markets 
reduces the incentives of dispersed shareholders to monitor inside managers (Bhide (1993)).  
  3As the arguments on both side of this historic debate are compelling, in this paper, I take an 
agnostic position on the issue to explore the consistency of each side of the debate with available data. 
Using industry-level panel across a large cross-section of countries, I examine the importance of financial 
architecture to fostering innovation and growth based on differences in information processing. I begin by 
evaluating the total, average effect of financial architecture on innovation. That is, I test whether, by and 
large, industries realize faster or slower rates of technological progress if they are supported by market or 
bank-based systems. Given the opposing theoretical views, the answer to this question is not obvious.  
The evidence supports that market-based systems have, on average, a positive impact on innovation. 
Going beyond the analysis of this average effect, I then ask whether firms or industries that differ 
in their information intensiveness fare relatively better or worse in market or bank based systems.  Again, 
given the opposing theoretical views, one would expect informationally-intensive sectors to realize faster 
rates of technological progress in either bank-based or market-based systems. Exploiting industry-specific 
information about the asset composition of firms as a measure of the degree of information intensity, I 
thus ask if financial architecture has a heterogeneous impact across industrial sectors as suggested by the 
theory.  I find that financial architecture, indeed, has a heterogeneous effect on innovation, whereby 
specific firms or industries appear to benefit from market-based systems while others from bank-based 
systems.  
The empirical test I carry is as follows:  Firms with greater intangible assets in their asset 
composition are considered to be more informationally intensive. In the literature, the extent of intangible 
assets in firm’s asset composition – the intangible intensity – has been utilized variously as a measure of 
the informational sensitivity of the firm’s activities and as an indicator of the firm’s vulnerability to 
problems of informational asymmetry.  Industries with high intangibles in their asset mix are commonly 
knowledge-intensive sectors with nonstandard, relatively complex activities and outcomes that are less 
amenable to independent measurement. These are also sectors with soft assets that stand to lose more 
from information leakage.  Furthermore, Claessens and Laeven (2003) shows that there is a systematic 
pattern in intangible intensity across industrial sectors that can be attributed to technological and market 
  4conditions.  One would, therefore, expect to find stronger evidence of either effect of financial 
architecture by focusing the analysis on sectors that vary in intangible intensity. I examine the effects of 
market or bank orientation of the financial system on the realization of innovation by asking whether 
industrial sectors that typically use many intangible assets realize relatively faster rate of innovation in 
bank-based compared to market-based systems. The results show robust evidence that such industries 
realize relatively faster rates of innovation in countries with more bank-oriented financial systems. 
To sharpen the empirical tests, I also consider industrial differences on more innovation-related 
measures of information intensiveness, such as R&D activities, and patent use intensities.  In particular, I 
examine if industrial sectors that typically spend higher proportion of their revenues on R& D activities, 
or sectors that use relatively more patents realize faster rates of innovation in bank-based or market based 
financial systems. The use of such measures confirms the main finding that informationally intensive 
industries realize faster innovation in countries with bank-oriented financial systems.  
These results are robust to a number of checks, including alternative measures of the focal 
variables of interest, alternative explanations of the results, omitted variables bias, and simultaneity bias.  
In interpreting the results, however, the usual caveats related to possible weaknesses in the data and the 
choice of a particular time period and country sample, as well as methodological issues should apply. 
The two results – that market based systems foster innovation on average and that bank-based 
systems foster innovation in informationally-intensive sectors– are not in contradiction.  Rather, taken 
together, they confirm the basic predictions of the market-based and bank-based views.  Market-oriented 
financial systems foster innovation by enabling the identification and financing of new technologies, and 
industries in general where diversity of opinion persists (e.g., Allen (1993), Boot and Thakor (1997)).  On 
the other hand, the impact of financial architecture is not homogeneous across economic activities.  Bank-
based systems promote innovation especially in informationally sensitive economic sectors. This could be 
so for many reasons, including the fact that these are firms that have more to lose from information 
leakage related to impending innovation, closely consistent with the key predictions of the bank-based 
  5views of Yosha (1995) and Bhattachcharya and Chiesa (1995) that emphasize the advantages of banks in 
handling proprietary information.   
The paper contributes to the emerging empirical literature on the financial architecture-growth 
nexus
5. Levine (2002) examines the impact of financial architecture on per capita GDP growth and total 
factor productivity growth, and Beck and Levine (2002) explore whether the output growth of industries 
that differ in their dependence on external finance depends on financial architecture.  Both Levine (2002) 
and Beck and Levine (2002) find overall financial development and not financial system architecture as 
important for growth. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) reports that whether the financial system is 
bank or market oriented has little effect on firm growth.  Tadesse (2002), on the contrary, finds that across 
financially underdeveloped countries, industry growth is faster in bank-based systems than in market-
based systems and vise versa across financially developed countries. Countries dominated by small firms 
grow faster in bank-based systems and those with large firms in market based systems. Thus, financial 
architecture, in and of itself, is relevant for growth.  Hence, as Allen (2000), summarizing the literature, 
notes the empirical evidence on the merits of bank based versus market-based systems is mixed. In the 
context of this controversy, the paper examines and provides evidence on the role of appropriate financial 
architecture for spurring technological innovation as an engine of growth. 
The paper extends the literature by analyzing and documenting an information-based channel 
through which financial architecture could affect economic performance.  Earlier studies focus on 
differences in financial architectures in terms of capital provision (e.g., Levine (2002) and Beck and 
Levine (2002)), finding no difference, and others emphasize differences in the compatibility of financial 
system design to countries’ legal and contractual environments (e.g., Tadesse (2002)).  Beck and Levine 
                                                 
5 The debate on the relative merits of bank-based versus market based financial systems is historical, and the 
literature goes back much further. For example, Goldsmith (1969) provide a comparison of the financial systems of 
Germany and the U.K., and Gerschenkron (1962) reports on the importance of the bank, Credit Mobilier, for the 
industrialization of France and that of the Great Banks for the development of Germany. Mayer (1990) reports how 
the Japanese banking system contributed to its post-war development, and Cohen (1967) documents on the role of 
such banks as Banca Commerciale Italiana for Italy. On the other hand, Bagehot (1873) and Hicks (1969) emphasize 
the role of the mature securities markets in Great Britain as a precursor of the Industrial Revolution.  
 
  6(2002), for example, examine whether industries that are heavy users of external capital grow faster in 
bank or market based systems, underlining the differences in the two systems in mobilizing capital for 
externally dependent firms.  Instead, recognizing that financial systems provide both capital mobilization 
and governance services in the form of information processing and monitoring, the paper complements 
existing research by arguing that the differential effectiveness of bank-based versus market-based systems 
may arise from the relative comparative advantages of the two systems in processing information. With 
such a view, I draw a particular channel through which financial system design could influence economic 
performance – i.e., via its effect on firms’ conduct in adopting new technologies.  Hence, instead of 
searching for a general association between financial architecture and performance as in, e.g., Levine 
(2002), the paper examines a particular channel by focusing on the technological response of industries 
with diverse asset structures to variations in financial architecture. In so doing, it provides the first 
evidence on the effect of financial architecture on the attainable technological progress of industries that 
vary in their asset composition, reflecting their informational environments. 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II introduces the empirical 
methodology and the data.  Section III reports the main results. Section IV provides robustness tests, and 
Section V concludes. 
II.  Methodology and Data 
A.   Empirical Model Specification 
To explore the relations among financial architecture, information, and technological innovations, 
I use the setup of Rajan and Zingales (1998, RZ hereafter)
6. RZ introduced an innovative methodology to 
explore the relation between financial development and economic growth in a cross-industry cross-
country setting.  They argue that, if financial development matters, firms with greater ‘natural’ demand 
for external finance should grow faster in financially developed countries.  To test this, they need a 
measure of the ‘natural’ demand for external finance. RZ construct a measure of the dependence of 
                                                 
6 Other studies that use the RZ methodology include, among others Ceterolli and Gambera (2001) to study the 
impact of banking industry structure, and Fisman and Love (2002) to examine the role of trade credit.  
  7industries on external finance based on the degree of external financing by U.S. firms.  They argue that 
the relative sophistication and efficiency of capital markets in the U.S. allows U.S. firms to raise external 
capital to their desired level.  Hence, there should be technological and economic reasons why some 
industrial sectors depend more on external finance than others in the U.S., and that these differences 
across industrial sectors should prevail in other countries as well.  This does not imply that two industrial 
sectors in two countries will have identical degree of external dependence; rather the rank order of 
industries by their degree of external dependence should be similar across industries.  They, therefore, use 
the external dependence of U.S. industries as a proxy for technology-driven ‘natural’ degree of external 
dependence in other countries as well, and show that industries that are more dependent on external 
finance grow faster in financially developed countries. 
The RZ framework has been utilized in Claessens and Laevens (2003) to examine the role of 
property rights in spurring economic growth.   They postulate that strong property rights protection 
should be more important to firms with high intangibles in their asset mix, since soft assets are more 
vulnerable to expropriation including outright theft.  They argue, following RZ (1998) that ‘the well-
protected property rights in the U.S. should allow U.S. firms to achieve the desired…asset structures for 
their respective industrial sectors’ (Claessens and Laeven (2003), p. 2406). They then use this ‘desired 
extent of asset mix’ by U.S. industries as the optimal asset mix of an industry anywhere in the world.  
They find that intangible-intensive industries –i.e., industries with greater intangible usage in their asset 
composition – indeed, grow faster in countries with stronger property rights. 
In this study, I argue that industrial sectors that differ in their asset composition in terms of their 
intangible intensity should fare relatively better or worse in countries with different financial 
architectures.  I argue that the differential asset-mix in the U.S. industries also reflects the differences in 
the complexity and sensitivities of information, reflecting the nature of the underlying technologies and 
economic activities.   I, thus, use the intangible intensity of industrial sectors as a proxy for the 
informational intensiveness of the sectors’ economic activities that is driven by technological and market 
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the innovative activities of such sectors.  Intangible intensive activities are relatively knowledge based, 
soft, hard-to-monitor, and generally more complex activities.  The market-based view that financial 
markets allow financing of innovations in situations where diversity of opinion is substantial suggests that 
more complex activities fare better in market based economies.  On the other hand, the bank-based views 
of, among others, Yoshi (1995) and Bhattacheria and Chiesa (1995) predict that such industries should 
prosper in bank-based economies because of the high value of confidentiality. Claessens and Laeven 
(2003) shows that the degree of intangible intensity in firms’ asset mixes vary across industrial sectors.  
Hence, evidence that industries with greater intangible-intensity realize faster rates of innovation in 
market-based or bank-based systems provide a direct test of the market or bank based view of the role of 
financial system configuration to innovation. 
What is needed, ideally, is a ranking of industrial activities by the degree of complexity and 
sensitivity of information –  the informational environment of the industry –  reflective of the nature of 
innovation-related economic activities. I use the measure of intangible intensity as a proxy for the 
information intensiveness of the industry for a number of reasons. First, intangible assets represent 
activities with inherently uncertain, long-term payoffs, such as assets representing R & D efforts, and 
those related to brand names. High intangible activities are generally knowledge-based, hard-to-monitor, 
and less amenable to valuation agreements, an attribute of the information environment we wish to 
measure. Second, as a result, firms with substantial intangibles are also considered to have more 
informational asymmetry (see, e.g., Barth, et al. (2001)).  They have soft, hard-to-monitor assets also 
means that intangibles are relatively prone to information leakage.  Finally, the asset mix of the industry 
is reflective of the nature of the underlying economic activities.  Since the values of intangible assets 
(versus tangible properties) are relatively more firm-specific, a measure based on intangible intensity 
would be reflective of the firms’ internal information environment.   Other potential measures could be 
measures of the difficulty of performance measurement by outsiders, such as the degree of analyst 
forecast consensus, and more direct measures of innovation-related activities, such as R&D costs and the 
  9use of patents. The problem with using analyst’ forecast consensus is, however, that it primarily reflects 
the noise in the reporting environment, rather than the nature of the firms’ activities. In addition, lack of 
consensus may simply reflect firm specific risk (volatility) than the level of information (Clarke and 
Shastri (2001)).  Nonetheless, the ranking of industries by intangible intensity closely mirrors the ranking 
based on financial analysts’ difficulty in earnings forecast. As a robustness check, I also perform the 
analysis using forecast consensus for U.S. industries.  Additionally, sharper measures of the information 
environment surrounding the industrial innovation-related activities might be more direct measures of 
innovation, such as the degree to which the industry invests on R & D activities and the degree to which it 
rely on acquisition and protection of patents. In our context, the use of these measures introduces 
significant endogeneity problem, as these same measures are also commonly used as measures of 
technological innovation. Nonetheless, I also report the results using R&D activities, and industrial patent 
use for robustness.   
I use manufacturing
7 industrial sectors as units of observation, and examine if industries that vary 
in their use of intangibles in their asset mix fare better or worse in bank or market based systems. In the 
basic empirical model, following RZ, I regress a measure of industrial rate of innovation on a variable 
that interacts a measure of the industry’s intangible intensity and the financial architecture of the country, 
controlling for non-observable country, industry, and time related sources of industrial innovation
8. The 
specification of the basic empirical model is as follows: 
                                                 
7 As RZ note, this is done “… in order to reduce the dependence on country-specific factors, like natural 
resources…” (Rajan and Zingales (1998, p. 567). 
8 To address the main research question, we need variations in the independent variables, such as financial 
architecture. One approach is to examine how the technological performance of industries changes as a country 
moves from one form of financial architecture to another over time.  However, this is less feasible because the 
financial architecture of a country does not show much variation over time. The movement of countries from 
relatively bank-based to market-based systems and vise versa is gradual.  Another approach is to observe the 
technological responses of similar industries across countries as a function of financial architecture (which has 
cross-country variation). This is the approach taken in this paper, and is in line with the literature on financial 
architecture (e.g., Levine (2002), Beck and Levine (2002)), finance and growth (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998) as 
well as the extensive empirical literature on economic growth. 
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where TECH is a measure of the rate of technological innovation (to be fully explained below).  A 
subscript i indicates that the variable refers to the ith industry. Similarly, a subscript c indicates a variable 
referring to the cth country, and a subscript t, the tth year.  Uppercase coefficients indicate vectors.  The 
industry and year dummies control for industry-specific and period-specific sources of variation in 
technical innovation. The industry’s share in value added, measured as the total value added of industry i 
in the country as a ratio of total value added of the country’s manufacturing sector, measures the relative 
importance of the industry in the country.  The country controls include regressors customarily used in 
cross-country growth regressions.   
  Financial architecture is an index of the relative importance of financial markets to banks. The 
focal coefficient of interest is γ4.  A γ4 >0 indicates that industries that utilize greater intangibles in their 
asset composition, as a proxy for information intensity, innovate faster in market based financial systems. 
A γ4 < 0, on the other hand, would be consistent with the bank-based view.  In addition, to isolate the total 
effect of financial architecture, the country controls will include the variable ‘Financial Architecture’ 
separately.  Again the sign of the coefficient of this variable is a priori ambiguous.  
  One of the advantages of this specification is that it overcomes the identification problems 
encountered in the standard cross-country regressions by interacting a country characteristics (financial 
architecture) with an industry characteristics (intangible intensity).  The approach is less subject to 
criticism of omitted variable bias.  Strengthening these advantages, I will estimate the versions of the 
model with explicit country controls as random-effects specification.  This has an advantage of (i) 
accounting for intra-industry and intra-country correlations and (ii) enabling identification of the effects 
of country-factors, such as financial architecture more accurately.   
  11B. Data 
B.1 Data on Technological Innovation 
 
 To measure the dependent variable, the rate of technological innovation, I estimate structured 
production functions and identify technological progress as that portion of observed output growth 
attributable to changes in the underlying production function as a representation of the technology.  In so 
doing, I follow a long tradition in the growth economics literature going back to Solow (1957).   
Specifically, an aggregate index of improvement in an economic unit, extensively used in the literature, is 
the growth rate in output ( ). I first isolate the contributions of input factors (such as labor and capital) to 
output growth ( ) from the contributions of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) based on inter-country 
production frontiers.  I further model the TFP component of growth to be arising from either industry-
specific efficiency improvements or technological innovations. The effect of technological progress is 
measured as the shift in the production frontier over time holding input quantities at the same level.    
y &
y &
Structurally, I assume that there exists an unobservable production frontier that represents the 
maximum attainable output level for a given combination of inputs.  Letting g[.] to represent this best-
practice technology, the potential output level on the frontier at time t given a vector of factors of 
production x(t), would be, 
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where  is the level of (in)efficiency corresponding to actual output  , and represents the 
shortfall of actual output from the maximum, holding the level of technology constant. Differentiating the 
log of eq. (3) with respect to time, we have 
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  12Eq. (4) decomposes output growth into a combined effects of factor accumulation and scale economies 
(the first term), the shift in the production technology ( ), and efficiency changes during period t.  
Empirically, I represent eq. (3) by a translog stochastic production frontier (see Appendix 2).  I then 
generate the values of the realized rates of technological change (i.e., g
t g
t) based on the parameter estimates 
of the frontier.  The empirical proxy thus obtained is ∆TECH1, and it operationalizes .  ∆TECH1 
represents increases in output yield due to shifts in the best-practice technology, g[.]. As explained in 
Appendix 2 below, in computing ∆TECH1, the production frontier is estimated for a panel of industries 
across the sample countries, with country and industry effects appropriately controlled through a random 
effects specification.  Controlling for such country effects ensures that ∆TECH1does not pick up 
differences in production technologies owing to country peculiarities.  The parameter estimates from 
which the measures of technological change are constructed do not reflect country-specific sources of 
variations in production technologies so that the resultant measures would be comparable across 
countries. 
t g
  Alternatively, for checking the robustness of the main results, I derive the corresponding 
measures of the rate of technical innovation based on a stochastic cost frontier (see section IV (A) below).  
  The data for estimating the inter-country stochastic production and cost functions is obtained 
from the United Nations Industrial Statistics database. The database, which contains industry-level data 
on production and cost characteristics, has been extensively used in the finance-growth literature (see, 
e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Tadesse (2004)).  
  Table 1 provides a summary of the variables for the sample countries. There is a wide variation in 
economic performance across countries (see Panel A). Realized rates of technological change range from 
–1/2 percent per annum in Sri Lanka to 3.6 percent in Japan.  Ranking countries by their average realized 
rates of technical innovations we observe as in Figure 1 that technological progress is much faster in 
developed countries than in developing economies.  This may be a reflection of developed countries’ 
larger wherewithal to spur technological innovations, and as such it provides additional credence that our 
  13measure captures the cross-country differences in production technologies consistent with economic 
intuition.  In contrast, overall productivity does not appear to be significantly different between developed 
and developing countries (not reported). Realized productivity growth in the U.S. (3.1% per annum) 
compares well with that of the Philippines (3.3%).   
There is also an enormous variation across industries (see Panel B of Table 1), with the highest 
rate of technical progress registered in Industrial Chemicals industry (2.6%) which includes 
pharmaceutical and biotech firms and the lowest in the Apparel industry (0.8 %).  As would be expected, 
traditional industries exhibit slower rates of technical progress than their younger counterparts. External 
validation of the veracity of our measures of technological change is extremely difficult because of the 
lack of other comprehensive and consistent measures of innovation at the industry level.  However, the 
technological profile of the industries emerging from our measures appears to be consistent with 
indicators of technological activities from other sources. For example, Allen (1996) provides data on the 
ratio of scientific and engineering employment to total employment for selected industries in the U.S. for 
1979 through 1989.  This ratio is the lowest at 0.2 percent for the Apparel industry and the highest for 
chemicals industry at 10.9 percent, with primary metals at a modest 3.3 percent.  Patent use by U.S. 
industries in the 1980 through 1983 from Lach (1995) ranks the Apparel industry near the bottom while 
such industries as drugs, industrial chemicals and machineries are among the top. The ratio of company R 
& D funds to net sales over 1984-90 as reported by the National Science Foundation (1993) is the lowest 
for textile and apparel at 0.44 percent and is one of the highest for drugs and medicines at 8.7 percent. 
  B.2 Financial  Architecture 
There is no uniformly accepted empirical definition of whether a given country’s financial system is 
market-based or bank-based. Previous studies use stylized facts based on a handful of countries such as 
Germany as representative of a bank-based system and the U.S. as the prototype of a market-based system. I 
use a variety of financial architecture indicators which are based on aggregate cross-country data recently 
compiled at the World Bank. The data set described in Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) as well as Beck, 
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banking and the financial market sub-sectors of the financial system for a broad cross-section of countries 
over the period 1980 to 1995. I use a continuous variable, ARCHITECTURE, as a measure of financial 
architecture.  
ARCHITECTURE is an index of the degree of stock market orientation of a financial system and is 
based on three indices that measure the relative importance of the stock market compared to the banking 
sector in an economy. The three indices are measures of the relative size, activity and efficiency of the stock 
market in a given country vis-à-vis those of the banking sector. The variable ARCHITECTURE reflects the 
principal component of these three variables: architecture-size, architecture-activity and architecture-
efficiency.  Higher values of ARCHITECTURE indicate a more market-oriented financial system.  
Architecture-Size measures the relative size of stock markets to that of banks in the financial system. 
The size of the domestic stock markets is measured by the market capitalization of domestic stocks 
relative to the GDP of the country. The size of the banking sector is measured by the bank credit ratio 
defined as the claims of the banking sector against the private real sector as a percentage of GDP. 
This excludes claims of non-bank intermediaries, and credits to the public sector. Architecture-Size 
combines the two size measures as a ratio of the capitalization ratio to bank credit ratio. Larger values 
indicate more market orientation in terms of relative size. 
Architecture-Activity measures the activity of stock markets relative to that of banks. It is denoted by 
the ratio of total value of stocks traded to bank credit ratio. Total value traded as a share of GDP 
measures stock market activity relative to economic activity; bank credit ratio (defined above) 
indicates the importance of banks in the economic activities of the private sector. 
Architecture-Efficiency measures the relative efficiency of a country’s stock markets vis a vis that of 
its banks. Efficiency of stock markets is measured by the total value traded ratio, which is defined to 
be the share of total value of shares traded to GDP. Efficiency of banking is measured by bank 
overhead ratio, defined to be the ratio of banking overhead costs to banking assets. Architecture-
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(2001) also present measures using turnover ratio (instead of value traded) and find no different 
rankings. 
I take the principal component of the three series (capitalization to bank credit ratio, value traded to 
bank credit ratio, and the product of value traded and overhead ratios) and compute the composite measure 
ARCHITECTURE. As a robustness test, I also use the construction of the variable as a means-removed 
simple average of the series.  In addition, I will use the three components – Architecture-size, Architecture 
Activity, and Architecture-Efficiency separately as a measure of the market-orientation of the financial 
system. 
ARCHITECTURE provides a measure of the comparative role of banks and markets in the economy. 
The underlying measures which reflect the degree of bank development and stock market liquidity are shown 
to have effects on economic performance (see, Levine (1997) for review). High score on Architecture is 
associated with stronger investor protection and high accounting standards (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2001)), indicating that the measure of financial architecture reflects the legal and regulatory differences 
across countries. The alternative measures are also closely related with each other. The main 
ARCHITECTURE measure is strongly correlated with the Architecture-Size (coefficient, 0.954), 
Architecture-Activity (coefficient, 0.952) and Architecture-Efficiency (coefficient, 0.639).  It is also highly 
correlated with the measure of market orientation independently constructed by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2001) as a means-removed average simple average of the three series (correlation, 0.636), and the 
architecture measure by Beck and Levine (2002) as a principal component of the series (correlation, 0.744). 
The Architecture variable makes the intuitively attractive classification of the U.K., the U.S. (not in the 
sample because of its use as a benchmark), Canada and Singapore as more market-based systems, and 
Germany, Austria and Portugal as more bank-based.  ARCHITECTURE also identifies Japan as in between 
because Japan has a large, active market. This ordering is similar to what is found in the literature (e.g., Beck 
and Levine (2002)). 
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  I use the degree of intangible asset usage in an industry’s asset composition – intangible-intensity 
– as an industry-attribute relevant for the degree of impact of the financial system on the industry’s 
technological innovation.  Claessens and Laeven (2003) construct a measure of the intangible intensity for 
manufacturing industries based on the intangible intensity of industries in the U.S.  They argue, following 
Rajan and Zingales (1998), that ‘the well-protected property rights in the U.S. should allow U.S. firms to 
achieve the desired…asset structures for their respective industrial sectors’ (Claessens and Laeven (2003), 
p.2406).  This desired extent of asset mix could then be used to identify the optimal asset mix of an 
industry anywhere in the world.  Intangible intensity is computed as the ratio of intangible assets to net 
fixed assets.  Intangibles are measured as the net value of intangible assets (COMPUSTAT item 33) and 
include blueprints or building designs, patents, copyrights, trademarks, franchises, organizational costs, 
client lists, computer software patent costs, licenses, and goodwill.  I use the intangible-intensity measures 
for U.S. industries from Claessens and Laeven (2003) as measures of the desired asset composition 
unique to the corresponding industries in other countries. One advantage of this procedure is that it 
minimizes potential endogenity problem because we would exclude the U.S. industries from the analysis. 
Additionally, to construct the measures of intangible intensity, we use accounting data for U.S. industries 
from financial statements based on U.S. accounting standards.  As a result, we eliminate the potential 
measurement error that could arise due to different accounting treatment of assets because of differences 
in accounting standards and procedures across countries. 
  Alternatively, for robustness, I use two other industry variables to characterize the information 
intensity of the sector.  The first is the degree to which an industry invests in R & D activities, and is 
measured as the ratio of R&D costs as a proportion of revenue. The second one is the extent of patent use 
by U.S. industries from Lach (1995). In addition, I use the average analyst earnings forecast consensus in 
the U.S. by industry. 
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The sample is a panel of ten manufacturing industries across thirty-four countries over the period 
1980 to 1995.  The sample period coincides with the period for which the index of financial architecture 
is available, hence limiting the study period. Panel C of Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the 
sample.  I have complete data for thirty-five countries; however, following RZ, I use the U.S. as a 
benchmark to identify the intangible intensiveness of the industries, and exclude it from the analysis.    
III.  Results 
 
Table 2 presents the main empirical results. I begin with evaluating the impact of financial 
architecture to the average industry, irrespective of the latter’s asset composition.  To do so, I relax the 
specification of the basic model in eq. (1) by replacing the country dummies with explicit country-specific 
variables, including financial architecture. In column (1) of Table 2, financial architecture is the only 
country-level variable and the interaction term (meant to capture the particular channel that is the focal of 
this study) is excluded. I would like to evaluate the pure general effects of financial architecture. The 
results indicate that the average industry realizes faster rate of technological progress in more market-
based financial systems. This is consistent with the market-based views that markets have comparative 
advantages over banks in identifying and funding innovations (Allen and Gale (1999); Boot and Thakor 
(1997)). 
This specification, however, is subject to omitted variables bias as it does not account for 
variables that have been shown to be important for economic growth and, by implication, for innovations. 
Examples of such variable that have been used in the growth literature include the level of per capita 
GDP, human capital, property rights, and measures of financial development (Romer (1990), Barro 
(1991), Claessens and Laeven (2003), and Levine and Zervos (1998)). Levine and Zervos (1998) find that 
stock market liquidity and overall bank development positively impacts long-run growth. I use the stock 
market liquidity measured as the stock market turnover ratio, and bank development measured by 
domestic credit to the private sector to GDP ratio (following Levine and Zervos (1998), and Cetorelli and 
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effects.  The importance of property rights protection for growth is increasingly recognized (see, e.g., 
Claessens and Laeven (2003)). Stern et al. (2000) show that the strength of a country’s protection of 
intellectual property rights affects its innovative capacity.  I use a broad index of property rights from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to measure property rights protection, and expect it to be 
positively related to technological change. The level of human capital is measured as the average of the 
number of years of schooling attained by the population over 25 years of age in 1980 (Barro and Lee 
(1993)) and is expected to have a positive effect on growth and innovation. Per Capita GDP is included to 
capture innovation-enhancing other institutional differences across countries. Developed countries have 
the resource wherewithal to keep them on the technological edge, suggesting a positive association 
between level of development and technical progress.   
In this extended model, financial architecture enters again with a large statistically significant 
positive coefficient, indicating that the market-orientation of the financial system has a general positive 
impact on technological progress.  The average industry realizes faster rate of innovation in more market-
based systems.  This result lends support to the prior that market-based systems foster technological 
innovations. The other country controls have the expected relations with technological progress. As 
would be expected, technological progress is faster in countries with better protection of property rights. 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Levine and Zervos (1998)), financial development as measured by 
stock market liquidity and bank development has significant positive impact.  Human capital has a 
statistically insignificant but negative coefficient. This is comparable to Rajan and Zingales (1998)’s 
finding of similar effect on industry growth. As expected, industries in developed countries realize faster 
technical progress, as those industries that are more important in the country as measured by share of 
industry’s value added to total manufacturing value added. 
I now turn to the focal relation of interest, namely, the differential effects of financial architecture 
across industries that vary in their asset composition. To examine this particular channel, column (3) of 
Table 2 includes the interaction between intangible intensity and financial architecture. Intangible 
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to control for the economy-wide effect of financial architecture, I include the variable separately as the 
only country-level control. To minimize the potential problem of omitted variables in this specification, 
column (3) also includes other country controls common in standard growth regressions.   The model 
contains industry and period dummies as well. The result indicates that informationally intensive 
industries realize relatively faster technological progress in relatively bank-oriented countries. The 
interaction term is negative and statistically significant at one percent level. On the other hand, the general 
effect of financial architecture remains the same: the average industry realizes faster rate of innovation in 
more market-based systems. The two effects of financial architecture are robust to the inclusion of the 
various control variables, all with coefficient estimates consistent with priors.  In the industries with 
higher intangible intensity, the benefits of bank-based systems appear to outweigh that of market-based 
systems. For least intensive industries, the net benefit of market-based systems is positive, implying that 
the general effects of market-based systems outweigh the heterogeneous industry-specific effects for these 
industries. 
The two major findings – that market-based systems promote technological innovation in general 
and bank-based systems promote innovation in industries with greater intangible-intensity– may appear in 
conflict.  In fact, the combined results are consistent with the theoretical priors. It suggests that market-
based systems have a positive effect on innovation that, on average, affects all sectors indiscriminately.  It 
could be that market-oriented financial systems enable the identification and financing of new 
technologies where diversity of opinion persists, of which all sectors in the economy benefits (Allen 
(1993) Allen and Gale (1999)). On the other hand, introducing differences in industries in knowledge 
intensiveness, we find an industry-specific positive effect of bank-oriented (and negative effect of market-
oriented) financial system. This is consistent with the theoretical prior that banks have a comparative 
advantage in economizing transactional and informational costs in funding innovations, which could be 
more important in sectors which are informationally intensive. As such, the finding is consistent with the 
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Bhattachcharya and Chiesa (1995); Yosha (1995)).   
In column (4), I estimate the regression that includes indicator variables for all countries and for 
all industries, effectively controlling for all country-related, industry-related and period-related sources of 
variation in the dependent variable. The coefficient estimate of the interaction terms is robustly negative 
and significant at one percent level. It does not appear that one country or industry is responsible for the 
results. The explanatory power of the regression goes up significantly suggesting the importance of 
omitted inter-country and inter-industry differences in explaining variations in the rates of innovation.  
This is the basic empirical model I use in the rest of the paper. 
IV.  Statistical Robustness Tests 
To ensure accurate inference and avoid mechanical explanations for the main results so far, I 
provide a series of robustness tests in this section, for which I focus on the basic empirical model 
specification.  All the pertinent robustness tests have also been conducted on the first-order effects of 
financial architecture, which is shown to be very robust. 
A.  Alternative Measures of Rate of Technological Innovations 
In the foregoing, I used, as a dependent variable, a measure of technological innovation derived 
from the underlying production function as a representation of the technology as represented by g[.].  
There is another way to construct measures of technological change. Duality theory suggests that under 
certain regularity conditions
9, if producers pursue cost minimizing objective, the production function can 
be uniquely represented by a cost function, and therefore one can infer the rate of technological progress 
from the cost function.  Letting h (.) be the best practice variable cost frontier, the minimum possible 
variable cost for period t, given input price of w, the level of fixed input I, and output y is given by 
(5)                    ) ), ( ), ( ), ( ( ) ( t t y t I t w h t C ci ci ci
F
ci =
                                                 
9To be a valid representation of the technology, a cost function should be a non-negative, non-decreasing function of 
output y; a non-negative, non-decreasing concave function in input prices; and twice differentiable with respect to 
input prices.  Furthermore, a restricted (variable) cost function should be a non-positive and convex function of 
quasi-fixed input quantities. 
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where  0 ) ( ≥ t ci θ , represents the degree of economic efficiency and measures the excess of actual cost 
over the minimum, holding the level of technology, input prices and output constant.  Differentiating the 
log of eq. (6) with respect to t, and noting that improvements in terms of cost mean cost diminution, we 
obtain: 
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Eq. (7) decomposes the rate of cost diminution into share-weighted rate of growth in input prices (first 
term), shadow values of fixed inputs (second term), output scale economies (third term), technological 
progress (fourth term) and efficiency improvements.   represents the downward shift in the cost frontier 
over time and is considered to be the cost effects of technological progress.  Empirically, I represent eq. 
(6) by a translog stochastic cost frontier (see Appendix 1).  I then generate the predicted values of realized 
rates of real cost reduction based on the parameter estimates of the frontier. The proxy thus obtained is 
∆TECH2, and is an empirical equivalent of . 
t h
t h
  Column (1) through (3) of Table 3 presents the main results using this alternative measurement of 
the dependent variable.  It clearly indicates that the main results are robust. Financial architecture has a 
positive first-order effect (columns (1) and (2)) and a negative industry-specific second-order effect 
(column (2) and (3)).  Both effects are statistically highly significant and of the same order of magnitude 
as those in Table 2.  
B.  Alternative Measurement of Financial Architecture 
  The measure of the market-orientation of the financial system, ARCHITECTURE, is constructed 
as the first principal component of three separate indices that measure the relative importance of markets 
versus banks in terms of their relative size, extent of activity and their relative efficiency.  The variable 
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also consistent with previous research (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001), Beck and Levine (2002)).   
  To check for the robustness of the results to measurement issues related to this independent 
variable, I use alternative measures in column (4) through (10) of Table 3.  Column (4) uses a measure of 
financial architecture constructed as a means-removed simple average of the measures of size, activity 
and efficiency, and is taken from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001).  The result is robust to measuring 
financial architecture using this variable.  Beck and Levine (2002) uses three different measures to 
characterize financial architecture: a principal component aggregation of the architecture-size and 
architecture-activity indices, the degree of state ownership of banks, and the degree of regulatory 
restrictions of banks. They argue that bank-based systems are also characterized by state ownership and 
regulatory restrictions.  Columns (5) through (7) use the indices of Beck and Levine (2002). The results 
are very robust.  The interaction terms with financial architecture (column (5)), indicating more market-
orientation, is negative and significant, while the interactions with more state ownership (column (6)) and 
more restriction (column (7)), indicating more bank-orientation, are positive and statistically significant. 
  Columns (8) through (10) use the component measures of Architecture-size, Architecture-activity 
and Architecture-efficiency separately instead of the aggregate index.  The result is again robust; the 
interaction term carries a negative coefficient that is both statistically significant and of the same order of 
magnitude. 
C.  Alternative Measures of Industrial Information Intensity? 
As a measure of informational intensity by industry, I use the intangible intensity typical of 
industrial sectors in the U.S. The use of this variable as well as employing the U.S. as the benchmark 
country may raise a number of concerns.  To begin, the U.S. financial system is a prototype market-based 
system, and, it may be argued that the use of the U.S. as a benchmark may bias the results in favor of 
market- based financial architecture.  Furthermore, the measures of intangible intensity for U.S. industries 
reflect accounting standards and procedures in the U.S.  To check for the robustness of the results to these 
  23concerns, I use Germany and Japan, two typical bank-based systems, as the benchmark countries.  I 
compute the mean intangible intensity (intangible assets to tangible assets ratio) for each of the ten 
industries of the sample in Germany and Japan respectively.  The data is obtained from the WorldScope 
database, and the average intangible intensity for the respective industry was calculated over the period 
1980 through 1995.  In column (1) of Table 4, I use the intangible intensities of German industries instead 
of the U.S. industries.  Accordingly, because Germany is serving as a benchmark country, it is dropped 
from the sample and the U.S. is included. The results in column (1) indicate that changing the benchmark 
country does not alter the main results.  The intangible intensity-financial architecture is significantly 
negative.  In column (2), I use the intangible intensity measures of Japanese industries instead. The 
sample is adjusted to exclude Japan, the benchmark country, but include Germany and the U.S.  Again, 
the results are robust. Industries high on intangible intensity realize faster rates of technical innovation in 
more bank-oriented financial systems, regardless of which benchmark country is used.  In addition, this 
finding provides evidence that the results hold despite differences in accounting standards that may affect 
the measurement of intangible intensity. 
Intangible intensity is used as a measure of information intensiveness peculiar to the 
technological environment of the industry. Alternately, it may be suggested that more direct measures of 
technological activities, such as the extent of R&D activities or that of patent acquisitions might be 
appropriate.  The main problem of using such measures is that measures of R & D activities and their 
outcome, the extent of patenting, are commonly used as measures of technological innovation (see, e.g., 
Bartel and Sicherman (1999)), and hence their use as explanatory variables introduces endogeniety.  
Nonetheless, in columns (3) through (6), we check if the results are robust if we measure information 
intensiveness differently.  In column (3) through (5), I use the extent of R & D activities by industries – 
R&D intensity.  The variable is constructed as the ratio of R & D costs as a percentage of revenue based 
on financial statement data in the WorldScope database. I calculate the average R & D intensity for each 
firm in the industry over the sample period of 1980 through 1995.  The industry R & D intensity is the 
median of the firm mean averages.  The regressions use the R & D intensities of the U.S., German and 
  24Japanese industries respectively in columns (3) through (5).  In each case, I drop the benchmark country 
from the sample. This would minimize the endoginiety problem discussed above. The results confirm the 
robustness of the main findings.  Industries high in informational intensities appear to realize faster 
technological innovations in more bank-oriented countries.    
In column (6) of Table 4, I use the extent of patent use in the industry as an alternate measure of 
information intensity relevant to technology in the industry.  Patent data are generally collected by 
technology field, and have not been available by industry.  I use the number of patents used by 
manufacturing industries in the U.S. in the 1980s analyzed in Lach (1995).  The variable is the number of 
patents used during 1980 through 1983, the last year for which data is available, as a fraction of that used 
in the 1970s.  The use of patents as a proxy for information intensity suffers from endogeniety bias in that 
the variable is also a measure of the extent of innovation.  However, in the regression, I drop the U.S., the 
benchmark country, from the sample and use the U.S. industries’ extent of patenting as a proxy for 
information intensity in industries in other countries, which mitigates some of the endogeniety problem.  
Column (6), again, confirms the main findings of the study.  Industries with higher information-intensity 
realize relatively faster technical innovation in bank-based economies.  The interaction term between 
patent intensity and financial architecture is robustly negative. 
  Another way of measuring information intensity might be to assess the difficulty outsiders, such 
as financial analysts, encounter in assessing firm performance.  For example, the extent of consensus in 
financial analysts’ forecast of a firm’s earnings could signal about the complexity of the firm’s activities, 
and hence the difficulty with which its outcome can be assessed.  Analyst forecast consensus has also 
been used extensively in the literature as a measure of informational asymmetry (see, e.g., Clarke and 
Shastri (2001)). The problem in using such a variable as a measure of information-intensiveness for an 
industry is that lack of analyst forecast consensus may reflect more the external informational 
environment or the noise outside the firm.  For example, low consensus may be attributable to lack of 
investors’ interest and low analyst following. Hence, analyst forecast consensus is, at best, a noisy proxy 
of information-intensity attributable to the technology of the firm.  With these caveats, I use, in column 
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measured as the coefficient of variation of annual earnings forecast from the mean annual forecast based 
on data from IBES.   I calculate the average forecast consensus for each firm in the industry over the 
sample period of 1980 through 1995.  The industry forecast consensus is the median of the firm averages.  
I dropped the benchmark country, the U.S., from the sample.  The results in column (7) confirm the basic 
findings that informationally-intensive industries, measured this way, fare better in relatively bank-based 
systems.     
D.  Could the results be due to better property rights protection? 
The importance of property rights protection for fostering growth and innovation is increasingly 
recognized (see Basley (1995); Cleassens and Laeven (2003)). Stern et al. (2000) provides strong 
evidence that the degree of protection afforded to intellectual property rights affects countries’ innovative 
capacity.  It might be argued that, therefore, the financial architecture measure is simply a proxy for the 
degree of property rights protection in the country and so the effects documented could be simply effects 
of better property rights instead of financial architecture.  We can check for this possibility by explicitly 
including measures of property rights protection.  I use six different measures of the degree to which 
countries protect property rights from various sources. These are (1) a broad index of property rights from 
the International Country Risk Guide (PROPERTY RIGHTS ICRG), (2) a rating of protection of property 
rights from the index of economic freedom (PROPERTY FREEDOM), (3) a rating of protection of 
intellectual property rights based on the “special 301” placements of the U.S. Trade representative 
(INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY), (4) a patent rights index by Ginart and Park (1997) (PATENT 
RIGHTS), (5) an index of the general legal protection of private property from the World Economic 
Forum (WEF), and (6) an index of intellectual property rights from the World Economic Forum 
(INTELLECTUAL WEF). A detailed definition of the variables is provided in Appendix 1. These 
variables have been used in previous research. For example, Claessens and Laeven (2003) find that 
property rights protection affects growth through shaping firms’ asset allocation.  
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property rights. In columns (1) through (6), I include an interaction of each of the property rights variable 
with intangible intensity in the model containing the interaction of intangible intensity with financial 
architecture.  The intangible intensity-financial architecture interaction is consistently negative and the 
coefficients statistically significant at one-percent level.  As would be expected and consistent with 
Claessens and Laeven (2003), industries with higher use of intangibles realize relatively faster rates of 
technological progress in countries with better property rights protection
10.     
E.  Could the results be driven by omitted variables? 
  It may be argued that differences in other country specific comparative advantages (i.e., other 
than financial architecture) or industry-specific characteristics (i.e., other than intangible intensity) may 
be dictating the observed relations on industrial technological progress.  However, these results cannot be 
explained unless the dependence of the industry on that comparative advantage is correlated with 
intangible intensity, and that financial architecture is a proxy of this unobserved comparative advantage. I 
minimize the possibility of this type of omitted variable bias by focusing on only manufacturing 
industries thereby reducing, for example, the influence of availability of natural resources.  
In addition, I can directly test if financial architecture or intangible intensity stands for something 
else. For example, it could be argued that the results are simply a reflection of the well-known effects of 
financial development (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998)). To check if this is the case, I include the 
interactions of intangible intensity with measures of financial development in the basic specification with 
the intangible intensity-financial architecture interaction.  A proxy for financial development used in 
many studies (e.g., Cetorelli and Gambera (2001); Rajan and Zingales (1998)) is bank development, 
measured as the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP.  Rajan and Zingales (1998) also 
uses an aggregate measure of financial development reflecting both the stock market and the banking 
                                                 
10 To be exact, Cleassons and Laeven (2003) include an intangible intensity-property rights interaction in a model 
that contains the interaction between external dependence and financial development and find both interactions to be 
positive where the dependent variable is growth. I replicate their results using my data as well.  
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market capitalization, stock market turnover and bank development.  Column (1) and (2) of Table 6 
presents the results.  I highlight that the main result that industries with greater intangible intensity realize 
relatively faster technological progress in bank-oriented systems remains robust, controlling for the fact 
that such industries also fare well with financial development. 
 It could be argued that knowledge intensive economic sectors are dependent on human capital as 
well.  If financial architecture is correlated with human capital, the observed effect might be a proxy for 
the interaction of the industry dependence on human capital and the availability of trained labor force in 
the country.  To test for this possibility, I include in column (3) the interaction of intangible intensity and 
human capital in the basic model that contains the intangible intensity-financial architecture interaction. 
Consistent with expectations, the coefficient of the human capital-intangible intensity interaction 
significantly positive, but I highlight the fact that the interaction between intangible intensity and 
financial architecture remains significantly negative and of same order of magnitude.  
It might also be argued that industries’ use of intangibles may reflect industry growth 
opportunities. This concern is analogous to Fisman and Love (2002b) critique of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) that external financial dependence may reflect the relative growth opportunities of industries. 
Using U.S. industries’ sales growth as measures of sectoral growth opportunities, they find that the 
interaction of this measure with financial development is robustly positive while the Rajan and Zingales 
(1998)’ interaction between external dependence and financial development disappears. 
If the argument is valid in our case, for a given financial architecture, it may not be 
informationally-intensive industries that realize faster technical progress instead those with better growth 
opportunities. If industrial growth opportunities are systematically correlated with financial architecture, 
the reported relations between technical progress and the interaction term will be spurious.  To check for 
this possibility, column (4) of Table 6 includes an interaction of a measure of industry growth opportunity 
and financial architecture in the basic model that contains the focal interaction variable.  I use the average 
growth rate in sales of U.S. industries from Fisman and Love (2002b) as a measure of industrial 
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intensity is robustly negative, suggesting that intangible intensity may not be a proxy for growth 
opportunities. The result replicates the positive effect of growth opportunities reported in Fisman and 
Love (2002b). 
Similarly, it could be that the effect of financial architecture via intangible intensity documented 
here might be a reflection of the effects of external financial dependence.  To the extent that firms rely on 
external finance to fund growth opportunities, it may be argued that the asset structure of industries may 
reflect their degree of external dependence.  Beck and Levine (2002) find that the growth of externally 
dependent industries is unaffected by financial architecture.   Column (5) shows that the results are robust 
to such a concern.  It includes an interaction of financial architecture with a measure of external finance 
dependence for U.S. industries from Rajan and Zingales (1998) in the basic regression that contains the 
intangible intensity-financial architecture interaction. The coefficient of the intangible intensity 
interaction is strongly negative.  Consistent with previous research, financial architecture does not explain 
performance across industries that differ in degree of external financial dependence.   
Another concern could be that financial architecture might be a proxy for the general countrywide 
investment opportunities or for the general level of economic development.  In that case, any relation 
between technological change and the interaction term is spurious because it may reflect differences in 
growth opportunities rather than the differences in the comparative advantages of financial architectures 
in funding industries’ innovation. To check for this, I add in column (6) the interaction of the log of per 
capita with intangible intensity in the basic model that includes the interaction of financial architecture 
and intangible intensity. The coefficient of the financial architecture interaction remains significantly 
negative.  Consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1998), the interaction with income is positive.  
F.  Reverse Causality? 
The results from the basic regression so far do not explicitly control for the potential for 
endogeneity. In examining the association between technological innovation and financial architecture, I 
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that the configuration of the financial system adapts to the technological characteristics of the country, 
and hence, financial architecture may simply be “a leading indicator rather than a causal factor”.  
The cross-country cross-industry results are less susceptible than the cross-country regression 
results.  First, I present a reasonable explanation of the mechanism through which financial architecture 
could lead to differential degree of technological progress among firms that differ in their asset 
composition.  As an advantage over the traditional cross-country methodology, a finding of within-
country between-industry difference in technological progress based on their degree intangible intensity 
is, in the words of RZ, “the smoking gun” in the debate about causality.  Second, by design, I use the U.S. 
industries’ intangible intensity to explain technological progress of industries in other countries, thereby 
reducing a potential endogeneity problem if I include the U.S. in the sample.  Third, I explicitly account 
for potential omitted variables, such as property rights. 
To address any remaining reverse causality concerns, however, I estimate the basic model using 
instrumental variables methodology. The ideal instruments are variables that might affect financial 
architecture but less likely to be affected by it. To select the appropriate instruments, I use theory and 
recent empirical works.  First, some identify the legal environment of countries as the critical factor that 
shapes its institutions. La Porta et al. (1998) argue that legal protections afforded to investors and 
country’s legal origin determine financial development, and that these, in turn, are primarily determined 
by a country’s colonial history.  Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Levine and Zervos (1998), among many 
others, use these variables as instruments for financial development. I include these variables as a 
potential set of instruments.  The second set is the geographic or environmental endowments of countries.  
The endowment theory of economic development contends that the geographical/environmental 
endowment of countries has left an indelible mark on long-lasting institution (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 
(2001)).  Institutions in many countries’ were shaped by their experiences during European colonization.  
Early colonists encountered varying climates around the world. Acemoglu et al. (2001), argue that current 
  30institutions reflect the willingness of colonial powers to settle. In colonies with inhospitable climates 
(mostly the tropics), the colonial powers avoided settlement, preferring to establish ‘extractive’ 
institutions; whereas, in colonies with hospitable climates (mostly the temperate), they established settler 
institutions that support private property and restrain the power of the State.  Natural endowments, 
therefore, may influence a broad array of institutions. I use the latitudinal distance of countries from the 
equator as a proxy for endowments. 
Columns (7) of Table 6 present the instrumental variables (IV) results. The first stage regressions 
reject the null hypothesis that they do not explain any of the cross-country variation in financial 
architecture. Column (7) confirms the major finding from Table 2 and 3 that financial architecture has a 
heterogonous impact on industrial technological progress. Specifically, the coefficients of the interaction 
term between intangible intensity and financial architecture is strongly negative.  The exogenous 
components of financial architecture predetermined by the extent of legal protection afforded to investors 
and the geographic /climate endowments of countries have a statistically significant impact on 
technological progress. Hence, the relations between technological innovation and financial architecture 
identified in this study are less likely to be explained by endogeneity.   
V.      Concluding Remarks 
Recent empirical research in finance and growth has established that financial development has a 
positive impact on economic growth. The consensus on the finance-growth link has ignited a renewed 
interest in the historic debate of whether a nation’s financial architecture – i.e. the degree to which the 
financial system is market or bank oriented -- matters to its long-run economic growth, and in particular, 
in fostering innovations and technology.  The theoretical debate on both sides of the issue is strong, and 
the available evidence is both anecdotal and mixed. 
Based on data on a broad cross-section of countries with industry panel, the study attempts to 
shade light on this historic debate, focusing on arguments on the relative merits banks versus financial 
markets in processing information. The findings suggest a significant impact of financial architecture on 
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positive effect on technological progress. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions that markets 
have a comparative advantage of identifying and funding new technologies where diversity of opinion 
matters.  On the other hand, the study also finds evidence that financial architecture has a heterogeneous 
effect across industries. In particular, knowledge-intensive industries, with soft, hard-to-monitor complex 
activities fare better in bank based financial systems.  This finding is consistent with theoretical models 
that emphasize the comparative advantages of banks in resolving transactional and informational 
imperfections, and models that emphasize the value of confidentiality and relationships. 
The implications of the paper are numerous. First, the findings indicate that financial architecture 
matters for long-term growth, and that the choice of an appropriate financial architecture is a source of 
value in and of itself. In particular, the appropriate financial architecture is a function of the industrial 
structure of the country.  Second, from a public policy perspective, at least in terms of the effects on 
innovations and technology, there does not appear to be a Pareto dominant policy regarding the optimal 
financial architecture. Market-based systems do not dominate bank-based systems and vice versa in all 
times. Third, given the financial architecture of the country, individual industries could attain different 
rates of innovation. That is to say the financial architecture of a country has heterogeneous impacts on the 
technological progress and productivity of industries. Hence, financial architecture plays an important 
role in shaping the industrial structure of the country.  Finally, and in sum, financial architecture partially 
dictates the pace of countries’ technological progress. 
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Definition and Sources of Variables 
Variable Definition  Sources 
Dependent Variables: 
      
   Rate of Technological Progress 
 
 
 
A measure of the change in real output attributable to technological innovation. It is 
measured as shift in the production frontier over time holding input factors and production 
efficiency constant, and represents increases in real output due to adoption of better 
technology.  
 
Alternatively, it is measured as the rate of real cost reduction computed as the rate of 
downward shift in the cost function over time, holding output and cost efficiencies constant.  
 
 
Constructed based on 
production and cost 
functions estimated 
using data form the 
UNIDO database. 
Independent Variables:  
 
     Financial Architecture 
 
 
 
 
 
   Intangible Intensity 
 
 
An index of the degree of stock market orientation of a financial system, and is a aggregate of three 
indices of the market orientation based on  (i) the relative size of stock market to that of banks, (ii) the 
relative intensity of activity in stock markets vis a vis the banking sector, and (iii) the relative efficiency 
of stock markets vis a vis the banking sector.  The size, activity and efficiency indices are aggregated as 
principal component. 
 
Ratio of intangible assets-to-net fixed assets of U.S. firms by industry sector over the period 
1980 to 1989. Primary Source: COMPUSTAT.  Intangibles is COMPUSTAT item 33 and 
represents the net value of intangible assets. Intangibles in COMPUSTAT includes 
blueprints or building designs, patents, copyrights, trademarks, franchises, organizational 
costs, client lists, computer software patent costs, licenses, and goodwill. Net fixed assets is 
COMPUSTAT item 8 and represents net property, plant and equipment. 
 
 
 
Constructed based on 
data in Beck et al (2000) 
 
 
 
 
Claessens and Laeven 
(2003) 
Control Variables:  
       
     Human Capital 
 
     Per capita GDP 
  
     Industry share in Manufacturing    value added 
   
    Stock Market Capitalization 
    
     Stock market Turnover 
 
     Bank Development 
 
 
     Property Freedom 
 
 
 
     Intellectual Property 
 
 
 
 
 
     Patent Rights 
 
     Property Rights (WEF) 
 
     Intellectual Property (WEF) 
 
     Property Rights (ICRG) 
   
 
 
     U.S. industry Sales Growth 
 
     Legal Origin 
 
 
     Legal Protection 
   
     Distance from the Equator 
 
 
The average for 1980 of the years of schooling attained by the population over 25 years of age. 
 
The logarithm of real per capita GDP in 1980  
 
Fraction of an industry’s real value added to the value added of the manufacturing sector 
 
Value of listed shares of stock outstanding divided by GDP 
 
Value of shares of stocks trades as a ratio of stock market capitalization 
 
 
Domestic credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP 
 
A rating of property rights protection (on a scale from 1 through 5), based on the degree of legal protection 
of private property and the likelihood of expropriation by the government. Median rating over 1995 
through 1999. 
 
An index of intellectual property rights  (scale 1 through 5), based on the ‘special 301’ placements of the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).  Special 301 requires the Office to identify those 
countries that deny adequate protection of intellectual property rights. Based on this rating, countries are 
categorized as Priority Foreign countries (i.e., countries with the least protection of intellectual rights), 306 
monitoring, Priority Watch, Watch list and Not listed countries.   
 
Index of patent rights protection in 1980. 
 
An index of property right (scale 1 through 7)  in 2001 from the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
 
An index of intellectual property rights protection (scale 1 through 7) in 2001 from the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) 
 
A broad index of property rights protection based on indices on the quality of bureaucracy, corruption, 
rule of law, risk of expropriation and risk of repudiation of contracts by the government from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
  
Real annual growth in sales of U.S. firms by industry averaged over the period 1980 through 1989. 
 
The origin of the legal tradition of the country.  The origin could be English common law, French civil 
law, German civil law, and German civil law. 
 
Indices of the legal protection afforded to shareholders and creditors in each country 
 
The distance of the country from the equator, scaled between 0 and 1 
 
 
Barro and Lee (1993) 
 
World Development 
Indicators 
Calculated from data in 
the UNIDO database 
Emerging Markets 
Database 
Emerging Markets 
Database 
 
International Finance 
Series from the IMF 
Index of Economic 
Freedom, Heritage 
Foundation 
 
USTR 
 
 
 
 
 
Ginarte and Park (1997) 
 
World Economic Forum 
 
World Economic Forum 
 
 
ICRG 
  
 
Fisman and Love 
(2002b) 
 
LLSV (1998) 
 
 
LLSV (1998) 
 
LLSV (1999) 
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Estimation of Rates of Technological Change  
A2.1  Empirical measures of Technological Change Based on Stochastic 
Production Function 
  I assume that there exists an unobservable function, a stochastic production frontier, representing 
the maximum attainable output level for a given combination of inputs.  I represent these best-practice 
production technologies by a translog production function of the form
11, 
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xci
j(t) and xci
k(t) are production inputs j and k used in industry i of country c during period t.  The 
production inputs are capital (K) and labor (L).   We use the variable t, an index of time, to represent the 
level of technology.  µci(t) is a one-sided random variable and measures the degree of inefficiency of  
industry i of country c in period t.  The specification is a random-effects model in which latent country 
and industry effects are specified as random variables. αc and ηi are the random unobservable country-
specific and industry-specific effects respectively, and νci(t) is the usual white noise. The distributional 
assumptions on the error components are: 
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11 Our choice of this particular functional form is dictated by its flexibility.  There is also evidence that manufacturing production 
is non-homothetic and exhibits scale economies, both of which are accommodated in the translog form. 
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estimates of the parameters. The predicted estimates of the technological progress are obtained from the 
parameter estimates of the production function as: 
(A2.1.3) 
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A2.2  Empirical measures of Technological Change Based on Stochastic Cost 
Function 
Under certain regularity conditions, the underlying production technology can be uniquely 
represented by a dual cost function. Employing this duality, I represent the underlying technology by a 
restricted translog cost function of the form:   
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 θci(t) is a one-sided random variable denoting the degree of economic inefficiency.  αc and ηi are country 
specific and industry specific error components.  ξci(t) is the usual disturbance term with mean zero and 
standard deviation σξ . The error components and the disturbance term follow the distributional 
assumptions in eq. (A2.1.2) above. Ln C is the log of costs.  ln Y is the log of output and ln K is the log of 
capital stock. Also note that, with imposition of homogeneity, the input price of labor becomes a 
numeraire, effectively entering in the intercept term. The empirical measure of technological progress 
based on the cost function represents the rate of cost reduction  
per year and is given by: 
(A2.2.2) 
t t Y t K t TECH tt ci yt ct kt t ci β β β β + + + = ∇ ) ( ln ) ( ln ) ( 2  
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1 TECH 2 TECH
TABLE 1 
Technological Innovation and Financial Architecture: Averages over the period 
1980-1995. 
 
  Technological Progress 
(based on Stochastic 
Production Frontier) 
 
     (∇ ) 
Technological 
Progress (based on 
Stochastic Cost 
Frontier) 
      (∇ ) 
Industry Share in 
Manufacturing 
 
 
    (SHARE) 
Financial 
Architecture 
 
 
(ARCHITECTURE) 
Log(Per Capita GDP) 
 
 
Panel A:  Averages by Countries   
Australia 0.023  0.030  0.043  0.938  9.704 
Austria 0.023  0.027  0.038  -1.552  9.856 
Belgium 0.027  0.031  0.032  0.205  9.791 
Canada 0.024  0.029  0.029  0.951  9.899 
Chile 0.012  0.022  0.026  0.198  6.086 
Colombia 0.014  0.024  0.061  -0.314  7.711 
Denmark 0.020  0.026  0.050  -0.037  7.096 
Egypt 0.015  0.026  0.061  -1.104  10.085 
Finland 0.020  0.024  0.042  -0.593  10.081 
Germany 0.033  0.035  0.045  -0.173  9.963 
Greece 0.017  0.023  0.054  -0.512  8.968 
India 0.015  0.028  0.051  -2.604  5.780 
Indonesia 0.007  0.021  0.040  -2.350  6.315 
Israel 0.014  0.022  0.037  0.465  9.287 
Italy 0.028  0.032  0.051  -0.486  9.757 
Japan 0.036  0.036  0.046  0.676  9.966 
Jordan 0.022  0.023  0.123  0.554  7.008 
Korea 0.022  0.027  0.055  0.491  8.527 
Malaysia 0.016  0.023  0.043  1.287  7.730 
Mexico 0.016  0.023  0.055  0.768  7.975 
Netherlands 0.025  0.028  0.057  0.454  9.786 
New Zealand  0.015  0.023  0.068  0.651  9.444 
Norway 0.021  0.027  0.043  -0.207  10.179 
Pakistan 0.006  0.019  0.043  -0.260  5.794 
Peru 0.019  0.026  0.051  0.433  7.524 
Philippines 0.010  0.022  0.058  0.355  6.566 
Portugal 0.022  0.028  0.048  -2.439  8.690 
Singapore 0.013  0.021  0.037  1.295  9.422 
Spain 0.025  0.029  0.045  -0.353  6.496 
Sri Lanka  -0.005  0.014  0.079  -0.290  9.344 
Sweden 0.021  0.028  0.040  0.759  10.123 
Turkey 0.018  0.025  0.046  0.711  7.880 
U. K.  0.030  0.033  0.044  1.112  6.984 
Venezuela 0.024  0.029  0.047  -0.434  9.949 
                                                    Panel B:  Averages by Industries 
Food Products          (ISIC 311)  0.022 0.029  0.116     
Beverages                (ISIC 313)  0.023 0.028  0.041     
Tobacco                   (ISIC 314)  0.019 0.024  0.028     
Textiles                    (ISIC 321)  0.021 0.028  0.056     
Wearing Apparel     (ISIC 322)  0.008 0.010  0.029     
Industrial Chemicals(ISIC351)  0.026 0.030  0.050     
Rubber Products       (ISIC355)  0.017 0.024  0.015     
Plastic Products        (ISIC 356)  0.014 0.023  0.021     
Iron and Steel           (ISIC 371)  0.026  0.031  0.041     
Machinery, except Electrical  (ISIC 382)  0.016  0.024  0.067     
Panel C: All Observations 
No. of observations 
 
Mean 
Standard Dev. 
Minimum 
Maximum 
2679 
 
0.019 
0.012 
-0.019 
0.056 
2679 
 
0.026 
0.007 
0.003 
0.053 
2626 
 
0.044 
0.041 
0.002 
0.326 
34 
 
-0.154 
1.051 
-2.604 
1.295 
34 
 
8.627 
1.380 
5.780 
10.179 
Growth in real value added is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for each of the ten industries in each of the thirty-four countries 
over the period 1980 to 1995. Technological Progress (∆TECH1) measures the shift in the production frontier over time, and represents increases in 
real output due to adoption of better technology. The alternative measure of technological progress (∆TECH2) measures the rate of downward shift in 
the cost function over time, holding output constant and represents the decrease in total cost due to better technologies. Industry Share in 
Manufacturing is calculated by dividing the real output of the industry in the country by the total real output of the manufacturing sector of the 
country. Financial architecture is a continuous variable that measures the degree of market orientation of a financial system and is a principal 
component of the size, activity, efficiency dimensions of financial architecture. ). Per Capita GDP is the logarithm of real GDP per capita in 1980. 
 TABLE 2 
The Average and Differential Impacts of Financial Architecture on the rate of Technological 
Innovation of Industries that vary in Intangible Intensity 
    1 2      3 4
 
Share of Industry value added to Manufacturing  0.054
*** 
(0.005) 
0.064
*** 
(0.005) 
0.064
*** 
(0.005) 
0.067
*** 
(0.004) 
Intangible Intensity * Financial Architecture     -0.0036
*** 
(0.0011 
-0.0041
*** 
(0.0008) 
Financial Architecture  0.0014
*** 
(0.00018) 
0.0006
*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0018
*** 
(0.0004) 
 
Property Rights    0.0013
*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0014
*** 
(0.0002) 
 
Stock Market Liquidity    0.0037
*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0041
*** 
(0.0007) 
 
Bank Development    0.0052
*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0050
*** 
(0.0007) 
 
Human Capital    -0.0000
(0.0001) 
0.0000
(0.0001) 
 
Per Capita GDP    2.99E-7 
(6.0E-8) 
2.4E-7
*** 
(7.2E-8) 
 
R
2 0.2745        0.5397 0.5151 0.7588
N          2624 2392 1728 1882
Countries          34 34 34 34
The dependent variable in all regression is the rate of technological progress for each industrial sector in each country. Share of industry value added to Manufacturing is 
calculated by dividing the real value added of the industry in the country by the total real value added of the manufacturing sector of the country. Financial architecture is a 
continuous variable that measures the degree of market orientation of a financial system and is a principal component of the size, activity, efficiency dimensions of financial 
architecture. Intangible Intensity is the ratio of intangible assets to net fixed assets to net fixed assets of U.S industries. Stock market capitalization is market value of listed 
stocks outstanding divided by GDP. Stock market liquidity is total value of stocks traded divided by stock market capitalization. Bank development is domestic credit to the 
private sector divided by GDP.  Property Rights is a broad index of property rights protection based on indices on the quality of bureaucracy, corruption, rule of law, risk of 
expropriation and risk of repudiation of contracts by the government from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Human capital is the average for 1980 of the years of 
schooling attained by the population over 25 years of age from Barro and Lee (1993). Per Capita GDP is the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1980.  Other regressors included, 
but not reported are country dummies, industry dummies and year dummies. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
*, 
**, and 
*** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  41TABLE 3 
The Average and Marginal Impacts of Alternative Measures of Financial Architecture on the Rate of 
Technological Innovation of Industries that vary in Intangible Intensity 
                      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Share of Industry Value Added 
to Manufacturing 
0.038
*** 
(0.0034) 
0.044
*** 
(0.0035) 
0.047
*** 
(0.0035) 
0.067
*** 
(0.0036) 
0.066
*** 
(0.0036) 
0.066
*** 
(0.0036) 
0.065 
(0.0036) 
0.068
*** 
(0.004) 
0.067
*** 
(0.003) 
0.066
*** 
(0.003) 
Intangible Intensity*Financial 
Architecture 
 -0.0016
** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0026
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0047
*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0057
*** 
(0.0009) 
0.00006
** 
(0.00003) 
-0.0013
*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0050
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0023
*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0014
* 
(0.0008) 
Financial Architecture  0.0002
* 
(0.0001) 
0.0008
** 
(0.0003) 
0.0007
** 
(0.0003) 
         
Property Rights (ICRG)               0.0009
*** 
(0.0001) 
Stock Market Liquidity               0.0028
*** 
(0.0004) 
Bank Development               0.0025
*** 
(0.0005) 
Human Capital               0.0000
(0.0000) 
Per capita GDP               2.3E-8
(5.0E-8) 
R
2 0.3257                    0.3252 0.4687 0.7577 0.7495 0.7452 0.7467 0.7604 0.7571 0.7554
N  2485                    1882 1728 1882 1831 1831 1831 1882 1882 1882
Countries  34                    34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34
The dependent variable in all regression is the rate of technological progress for each industrial sector in each country. The rates of technological progress used in columns (1) through (3) are derived from estimation 
of stochastic cost functions. Columns (5) through (7) use measures of financial architecture from Beck and Levine (2002). Columns (8) through (10) use the components of the aggregate index of financial 
architecture. Share of industry value added to Manufacturing is calculated by dividing the real value added of the industry in the country by the total real value added of the manufacturing sector of the country. 
Financial architecture is a continuous variable that measures the degree of market orientation of a financial system and is a principal component of the size, activity, efficiency dimensions of financial architecture. 
Intangible Intensity is the ratio of intangible assets to net fixed assets to net fixed assets of U.S industries. Stock market capitalization is market value of listed stocks outstanding divided by GDP. Stock market 
Liquidity is total value of stocks traded divided by stock market capitalization. Bank development is domestic credit to the private sector divided by GDP. Human capital is the average for 1980 of the years of 
schooling attained by the population over 25 years of age from Barro and Lee (1993). Per Capita GDP is the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1980. Other regressors included, but not reported, are country , industry, 
and year dummies. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
*, 
**, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  42TABLE 4 
The Differential Impacts of Financial Architecture on the Rate of Technological Innovation of 
Industries that vary in Various Measures of Informational Intensity 
            1  3 2  4 5  7 6
Share of Industry Value Added to 
Manufacturing 
0.066
*** 
(0.003) 
0.061
*** 
(0.003) 
0.064
*** 
(0.003) 
0.069
*** 
(0.003) 
0.0062
*** 
(0.003) 
-0.068
*** 
(0.004) 
0.069
 ***
(0.003) 
Intangible Intensity of German Industries 
* Financial Architecture 
-0.0035
*** 
(0.0008) 
          
Intangible Intensity of  Japanese 
Industries*Financial Architecture 
 -0.0003
 **
(0.0001) 
       
R&D Intensity of U.S Industries 
*Financial Architecture 
         -0.018
 ***
(0.003) 
R&D Intensity of German 
Industries*Financial Architecture 
          -0.1440
 ***
(0.020) 
R&D Intensity of Japanese Industries* 
Financial Architecture 
         -0.0590
 ***
(0.018) 
Patent Intensity of U.S. Industries * 
Financial Architecture 
        -0.0025
 ***
(0.0003) 
 
Analyst Consensus for U.S. Industries * 
Financial Architecture 
          -0.0423
 ***
(0.007) 
R
2 0.7905              0.7639 0.7687 0.7942 0.7644 0.7700 0.8069
N  2525              2664 2624 2525 2664 1882 2180
Countries  34              34 34 34 34 34 34
The dependent variable in all regression is the rate of technological progress for each industrial sector in each country. Share of industry value added to Manufacturing is calculated by 
dividing the real value added of the industry in the country by the total real value added of the manufacturing sector of the country. Financial architecture is a continuous variable that 
measures the degree of market orientation of a financial system and is a principal component of the size, activity, efficiency dimensions of financial architecture.  Intangible Intensity is the 
ratio of intangible assets to net fixed assets to net fixed assets of Germany and Japanese industries. R & D intensity is the ratio of R & D costs to sales revenue for industrial sectors in the 
U.S., Germany, and Japan.  Patent intensity in U.S. is the number of patents used in manufacturing industries in the U.S. obtained from Lach (1995).  Analyst forecast consensus in U.S. is the 
coefficient of variation in analyst forecast of annual earnings for U.S. industries.  Other regressors included, but not reported are country dummies, industry dummies and year dummies. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
*, 
**, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  43TABLE 5 
The Marginal Impacts of Financial Architecture and Property Rights Protection on the Rate of 
Technological Innovation of Industries that vary in Intangible Intensity 
              1 2 3 4 5 6
Share of Industry  Value Added 
to Manufacturing 
0.067
*** 
(0.0036) 
0.067
*** 
(0.003) 
0.072
*** 
(0.004) 
0.068
*** 
(0.004) 
0.068
*** 
(0.0036) 
0.0680
*** 
(0.0036) 
Intangible Intensity*Financial 
Architecture 
-0.0042
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0050
*** 
(0.0008 
-0.0041
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0047
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0042
*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0043
*** 
(0.0008) 
Intangible Intensity*Property 
Rights ICRG 
0.0004
(0.0004) 
     
Intangible Intensity*Property 
Freedom 
       0.0036
*** 
(0.0010) 
Intangible Intensity*Intellectual 
Property 
         0.0016
(0.0012) 
Intangible Intensity*Patent 
Rights 
        0.0022
** 
(0.0009) 
Intangible  Intensity*WEF        0.0009
(0.0009) 
 
Intangible Intensity*Intellectual  
WEF 
       0.0014
** 
(0.0006) 
R
2 0.7588            0.7603 0.7420 0.7596 0.7599 0.7603
N              1882 1882 1807 1882 1875 1875
Countries              34 34 34 34 34 34
The dependent variable in all regression is the rate of technological progress for each industrial sector in each country. Financial architecture is a continuous variable that measures the degree 
of market orientation of a financial system and is a principal component of the size, activity, efficiency dimensions of financial architecture. Intangible Intensity is the ratio of intangible assets 
to net fixed assets to net fixed assets of U.S industries. Share of industry value added to Manufacturing is calculated by dividing the real value added of the industry in the country by the total 
real value added of the manufacturing sector of the country. Property Rights (ICRG) is a broad index of property rights protection based on indices on the quality of bureaucracy, corruption, 
rule of law, risk of expropriation and risk of repudiation of contracts by the government from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  Property Freedom is a broad index of property 
rights from the Index of Economic Freedom, the Heritage Foundation. Intellectual Property is an index of protection of intellectual property rights from the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative. Patent rights are an index of protection of patent rights in 1980 form Grinarte and Park (1997).  WEF is an index of property rights protection from the World Economic 
Forum. Intellectual WEF is an index of intellectual property rights protection from the World Economic Forum Other regressors included, but not reported, are country, industry, and year 
dummies. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
*, 
**, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
The Differential Impacts of Financial Architecture on the Rate of Technological Innovation of 
Industries that vary in Intangible Intensity 
    1 2  4 3 5  7 (IV) 6
Share of Industry Value Added to 
Manufacturing 
0.068
*** 
(0.003) 
0.067
*** 
(0.003) 
0.067
*** 
(0.0035) 
0.067
*** 
(0.0036) 
0.067
 ***
(0.0036) 
0.0068
*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.074
*** 
(0.004) 
Intangible Intensity * Financial 
Architecture 
-0.0038
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0050
*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0050
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0027
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0045
 ***
(0.0008) 
-0.0050
*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0791
*** 
(0.0147) 
Intangible Intensity*Bank 
Development 
0.0065
*** 
(0.0019) 
         
Intangible Intensity*Financial 
Development 
          0.0014
(0.0011) 
Intangible Intensity*Human Capital           0.0010
*** 
(0.0003) 
US Growth in Sales*Financial 
Architecture 
          -0.0589
*** 
(0.0011) 
External Dependence*Financial 
Architecture 
           -0.0007
(0.0006) 
Intangible Intensity*Per Capita GDP          0.0027
*** 
(0.0006) 
 
R
2 0.7604              0.7589 0.7598 0.7623 0.7663 0.7612 0.7477
N  1858              1882 1882 1882 1882 1882 1676
Countries  34              34 34 34 34 34 34
The dependent variable in all regression is the rate of technological progress for each industrial sector in each country. Share of industry value added to Manufacturing is calculated by 
dividing the real value added of the industry in the country by the total real value added of the manufacturing sector of the country. Financial architecture is a continuous variable that 
measures the degree of market orientation of a financial system and is a principal component of the size, activity, efficiency dimensions of financial architecture. Intangible Intensity is the 
ratio of intangible assets to net fixed assets to net fixed assets of U.S industries. Human capital is the average for 1980 of the years of schooling attained by the population over 25 years of age 
from Barro and Lee (1993). Per Capita GDP is the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1980.  Other regressors included, but not reported are country dummies, industry dummies and year 
dummies. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
*, 
**, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 FIGURE 1 
Rates of Technological Innovation across Countries 
(a) Technological Innovation based on Stochastic Production Frontier ( )  1 TECH ∇
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